

ON GRACE AND DIGNITY

TRANSLATED BY GEORGE GREGORY

The Greek myth attributes to the goddess of beauty a belt, possessed of the power to endow the one who wears it with grace, and to obtain love. This goddess is accompanied by the goddesses of grace, or the Graces.

The Greeks therefore *distinguished* grace and the Graces from beauty, for they expressed them by such attributes as were distinct from the goddess of beauty. All grace is beautiful, for the belt of grace is a property of the goddess of Gnidus; but not all that is beautiful is grace, for even without this belt, Venus remains what she is.

According to this very allegory, it is the goddess of beauty alone, Juno, who wears and bestows the belt of grace; Juno, heaven's glorious goddess, must first *borrow* that belt of Venus, when she wants to charm Jupiter on Mt. Ida. Thus majesty, even if a certain degree of beauty adorns it (which one by no means gainsays the wife of Jupiter), is, without grace, not certain to please, since it is not on account of her own charms, but the belt of Venus, that the high queen of the gods expects triumph over Jupiter's heart.

Schiller began to write *On Grace and Dignity* in May 1793, after he had completed his correspondence with Körner on the subject of the beautiful. It is the first major published work of Schiller to decisively criticize the perspective of Kant on aesthetics, a fact noted by Humboldt in his intellectual biography of Schiller. *On Grace and Dignity* first appeared in print in July 1793, in the second issue of *New Thalia*.

The goddess of beauty may, after all, part with her belt and cede its power to one less beautiful. Grace is therefore not an *exclusive* prerogative of the beautiful; rather it can also pass, although only from the hand of the beautiful, over to the less beautiful, even to the not beautiful.

These Greeks bid him, to whom grace, or that which pleases, was lacking, whatever other merits of mind he possess, to make sacrifices to the Graces. They thus imagined these goddesses, indeed, as attendants of the fair sex, but yet as such with whom a man, too, might be indulged, and who are indispensable to him if he wishes to please.

But what now is grace, if she indeed loves to unite with beauty, but yet not exclusively? if she is indeed born of beauty, but reveals her effects also in one not beautiful? if beauty can indeed exist *without* her, but *through* her alone can beauty enkindle attraction?

The tender emotion of the Greeks differentiated quite early what reason was not yet able to elucidate, and, searching for an expression, borrowed it from the imagination, since the understanding could as yet offer it no concepts. This myth, therefore, deserves the philosopher's respect, who in any case must content himself with seeking the intuitions in which pure natural sense has laid down its discoveries, or, in other words, with explaining the hieroglyphics of emotions.

If one divests the idea of the Greeks of its allegorical shell, it seems to contain none other than the following meaning.

Grace is a changeable beauty: a beauty of its subject which can come to be and just as well cease to be. She thus distinguishes herself from fixed beauty, which is necessarily existent with the subject itself. Venus can take off her belt and momentarily relinquish it to Juno; her beauty she could surrender only with her person. Without her belt she is no longer the alluring Venus; without beauty she is no longer Venus at all.

This belt, the symbol of changeable beauty, has the extraordinary property, that it confers upon the person it

embellishes the objective quality of grace; it thus distinguishes itself from every other ornament which does not change the person himself, but merely the impression which the person makes, subjectively, in another's imagination. It is the expressed meaning of the Greek myth, that grace is transformed into a characteristic of the person, and that the bearer of the belt *becomes* actually charming, and not merely *seems* so.

A belt which is nothing more than a fortuitous outward ornament certainly seems no very fitting image to denote the *personal* character of grace; but a personal characteristic, which is at once thought as separable from the subject, could not be illustrated otherwise than by means of a fortuitous ornament, with which the person may part without detriment to himself.

The belt of grace, thus, does not work its effect *naturally*, since, in that case, it would be incapable of changing the person; rather, its effect is *magical*, that is, its power is enhanced beyond all natural conditions. It is by means of this expediency (which obviously is no more than a contrivance), that the contradiction should be resolved, in which the powers of description inevitably become entangled every time an expression is sought within nature for that which lies outside nature, in the domain of freedom.

If now the belt of grace expresses an objective characteristic, which can be distinguished from its subject without changing anything of its nature, then it can characterize nothing but beauty of movement, since movement is the only change which can occur with an object without dissolving its identity.

Beauty of movement is a concept which satisfies both requirements contained in the cited myth. It is, first of all, objective and belongs to the object itself, not merely to how we perceive it. It is, *secondly*, something fortuitous about the object, and the object remains, even if we think this characteristic away from it.

The belt of grace is not bereft of its magical power even upon those less beautiful, nor yet upon those who are not

beautiful at all, and even one who is not beautiful can *move* beautifully.

Grace, says the myth, is something *fortuitous* about its subject; therefore only fortuitous movements can have this characteristic. As far as the ideal of beauty is concerned, all *necessary* movements *must be* beautiful, because, as necessary, they belong to its nature; the beauty of *this movement* is therefore already *given* with the concept of Venus, whereas the beauty of the fortuitous movement is an *enhancement* of this concept. There is a grace of the voice, but no grace of breathing.

But is every beauty of fortuitous movement grace?

That the Greek myth restricts grace and the Graces exclusively to mankind, hardly need be recalled; it goes further, and confines beauty of form to the human species, in which the Greek, as we well know, also included his gods. But if grace is a prerogative of the human form alone, then none of those movements can lay claim to it which mankind has in common with that which is mere nature. Could the locks of hair on a beautiful head move with grace, there were no longer any reason why the branches of a tree, the waves on a river, the seeds in a cornfield, the legs of an animal, should not move with dignity. But the goddess of Gnidus represents the human species exclusively, and where the human being is nothing more than a thing of nature and a creature of sense, she ceases to have any meaning for him.

Grace, therefore, can only characterize willful movements, but also, among these, only those which express *moral* sentiments. Movements which have no other source than sensuousness, be they ever so willful, belong merely to nature, which never elevates herself to grace by herself alone. Could lust express itself with charm, instinct with grace, then were charm and grace no longer capable, nor worthy, of serving as an expression of humanity.

And yet, it is in humanity alone, that the Greek invests all beauty and perfection. Never may sensuousness show itself to him without soul, and to his *human* sentiments it

is at once impossible to *sever* raw animality and intelligence. Just as he pictures every idea at the same time with a body, and also strives to embody even things most spiritual, he thus demands of every act of instinct of a person at the same time an expression of his moral destiny. To the Greek, nature is never *mere* nature, for which reason he need never blush to know her; to him, reason is never *mere* reason, for which reason he need never shudder to tread under its rule. Nature and morality, matter and mind, Earth and Heaven, flow together with wondrous beauty in his poems. He introduced freedom, which is at home not merely in Olympus, also into the business of morality, and one will therefore want to indulge him, if he misplaces sensuousness, too, into Olympus.

Now, the tender sense of the Greeks, which only tolerates matter in the constant escort of the mind, knows of no willful movement of man which belongs to sensuousness alone, without that it be at the same time an expression of the morally sentient mind. For him, therefore, grace is but one such beautiful expression of the soul in willful movement. Where grace thus appears, the soul is the moving principle, and *in her* is contained the cause of the beauty of movement. And so every mystical conception of grace resolves itself into the following thought: "Grace is a beauty, the which is not granted by nature, rather brought forth by the subject himself."

Thus far I have restricted myself to develop the concept of grace out of the Greek myth, and, as I hope, without doing it violence. Now I beg leave, that I attempt what can be determined by way of philosophical investigation of the matter, and whether it is true here, too, as in so many other cases, that philosophizing reason can boast of fewer discoveries by far, the which intuition had not already *suspected*, and poetry not already *revealed*.

Venus, without her belt and without the Graces, represents to us the ideal of beauty, such as can come from the hands of *mere nature*, produced by formative forces, and *without the intervention of a sentient mind*. The myth cor-

rectly establishes for this beauty its own divine form as representative, since natural sentiment distinguishes her most strictly from the other, whose origin is indebted to the influence of a sentient mind.

Permit me to call this beauty of mere nature, that formed according to the law of necessity, the beauty of frame (*architechtonic beauty*), in distinction to that which is dependent upon the condition of freedom. By this name, therefore, I want to have that part of human beauty characterized, which is not merely *brought about* by natural forces (which holds good of every phenomenon), but which is *solely determined by natural forces*.

A fortunate proportionality of limbs, flowing contours, a pleasing complexion, tender skin, a fine and free growth, a well-sounding voice, etc., are advantages for which one is indebted to mere nature and fortune: to *nature*, which provided the appropriate predisposition, and itself developed them; to *fortune*, which shielded the forming work of nature from the influence of hostile forces.

This Venus rises already *fully perfect* from the foam of the sea, for she is a completed, strictly balanced work of necessity, and as such, capable of no variety, no enhancement. Since, to wit, she is nothing but a more beautiful enunciation of the purposes which nature intends for man, and therefore each of her characteristics is completely decided by the concept upon which she is founded, so may she—according to her predisposition—be judged as fully present, although this presence must still develop with time.

Architectonic beauty of the human frame must be distinguished from the frame's technical perfection. By the latter is to be understood the *system of purposes* itself, as they are united among themselves toward a highest final purpose; by the former, on the other hand, merely a *characteristic* of the manifestation of these purposes, such as they reveal themselves in their appearance to the observing faculty. If, therefore, we speak of beauty, neither the material value of these purposes, nor the formal artfulness of their composi-

tion, is taken into account. The observing faculty is exclusively concerned with the manner of appearance, without taking the slightest account of the logical constitution of its object. Although the architectonic beauty of the human frame depends on the concept upon which it is founded, and on the purposes which nature intends by it, yet aesthetic judgment still *isolates* it completely from these purposes, and nothing but that which properly and immediately belongs to the appearance will be included in the notion formed by aesthetic judgment.

Hence, we cannot say, that the dignity of man increases the beauty of the human frame. In our judgment on the latter, the notion of the former may be included, but then it immediately ceases to be a pure aesthetic judgment. The technology of the human frame is, of course, an expression of the purposes of man's destiny, and as such it may and should fill us with respect. But this technology is not presented to sense, rather to the understanding; it can only be *thought*, but it can never *manifest* itself. Architectonic beauty, on the contrary, can never be an expression of man's destiny, for it is directed at a quite different faculty than that which has to decide upon that destiny.

If, therefore, it is to man, preeminently over all other technical constructions of nature, that beauty is attributed, this is true only insofar as he claims this preeminence in his *mere manifestation*, without that one need be reminded thereby of his humanity. Were it otherwise, since this latter could not but occur as a conception, then it would not be sense, but understanding, which judged of beauty, which entails a contradiction. The human being, therefore, cannot account the dignity of his moral purpose, cannot urge his preeminence as a moral creature, if he wants to claim the prize of beauty; here he is nothing but a thing in space, nothing but one phenomenon among phenomena. His rank in the world of ideas is of no account in the world of sense, and if he wants to claim first place in this world, he can claim it thanks only to that in him which is *nature*.

But just this, his nature, is, as we know, attuned to the idea of his humanity, and so, indirectly, is his architectonic beauty as well. If he so distinguishes himself as preeminent to all creatures of sense around him by greater beauty, then for that he is indebted incontestably to his human destiny, which contains the cause whereof he distinguishes himself at all from other creatures of sense. But it is not on account of its being an expression of this atonement, that the human frame is beautiful, for were it this, then this same frame would cease to be beautiful as soon as it expressed a lesser purpose; then were the contrary of this frame also beautiful as soon as one might assume, that it could express that atonement. But presuming, that one might be able to completely forget in a beautiful human frame what it expresses, and that one could, without changing its appearance, insinuate into it the raw instinct of a tiger, then the judgment of the eyes would be absolutely the same, and sense would proclaim the tiger the most beautiful work of the Creator.

The destiny of man, as intelligent creature, therefore, contributes to the beauty of his frame only insofar as its manifestation, i.e., its expression, *coincides* at once with the conditions under which beauty produces itself in the world of sense. Beauty itself must always remain a free effect of nature, and the idea of reason, which determined the technology of the human frame, can never *bestow* beauty upon it, rather, merely allow it.

One might object, that absolutely everything which manifests itself in appearance is performed by forces of nature, and that this could not, therefore, be an exclusive characteristic of beauty. It is true: all technical forms are brought forth by nature, but it is not because of nature that they are technical; at least we do not judge them to be so. They are only technical because of reason, and this technical perfection, therefore, already has existence in reason, before it steps out into the world of sense and becomes an appearance. Beauty, on the contrary, has that unique characteristic, that she is not merely presented in the world of sense, but also first arises there; that nature not merely

expresses her, but also creates her. She is absolutely a characteristic only of the sensuous, and even the artist, who intends to effect her, can achieve that effect only insofar as he preserves the appearance that it is an effect of nature.

In order to judge the technology of the human frame, one needs the assistance of the conception of the purposes to which it is appropriate; one requires no such thing to judge the beauty of this frame. Sense alone is a fully competent judge here, the which it could not be, did not the world of sense (which is its sole object) contain all conditions of beauty, and were it not also thus perfectly sufficient for her production. *Indirectly*, of course, the beauty of man is founded in the conception of his humanity, but sense, we know, only depends upon that which is direct, and so, for sense it is just as much, as if she were a totally independent effect of nature.

From the foregoing, it might seem as if beauty were of absolutely no interest to reason, for she arises merely in the world of sense, and also addresses herself only to the sensuous faculty of knowledge. After having distinguished beauty from the conception of her as alien, from the mixture of which the *idea of perfection* in our judgment on beauty can hardly abstain, then nothing seems to remain to beauty, on account of which beauty could be the object of a reasoning pleasure. Nevertheless, it is as well established, that beauty *pleases reason*, as it is decided, that this is due to no such characteristic of the object, as were solely capable of discovery through reason.

In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, we must recall, that there are two ways by which phenomena become objects for reason, and are capable of expressing ideas. It is not always necessary, that reason *draws* these ideas *from* the phenomena, for reason can *place* ideas *into* them. In both cases the phenomena will be adequate to an idea of reason, but with a difference: in the first case, reason finds the idea objectively within, as if it only receives the idea from the object, because the conception must be posited, in order to explain the constitution, and often even the

possibility of an object; whereas, in the second case, it makes that which is independent of its conception in the phenomenon, spontaneously into an expression thereof, and thus treats something *merely* sensuous, as if it were more than sensuous. Thus, *in the first case*, the connection of the idea with the object is objectively necessary, whereas in the other, this connection is supremely subjectively necessary. I need not say, that by the former I understand perfection, by the latter beauty.

Since, in the second case, in respect of an object of sense, it is totally fortuitous, whether there is a reason, which connects one of its ideas with the presentation of the object to the senses, it follows, that the objective constitution of the object must be considered totally independent of this idea, and we are absolutely correct, to restrict beauty, *objectively*, to mere natural conditions, and to explain it as a mere effect of the world of sense. But since, on the other hand, reason makes a transcendental use of this effect of the mere world of sense, and impresses its stamp upon it by attributing to it a higher significance, we are also correct to place beauty *subjectively* into the intelligible world. Beauty is, therefore, to be viewed as a citizen of two worlds, belonging to the one by *birth*, to the other by *adoption*; she receives her existence in sensuous nature, and attains to the right of citizenship in the world of reason. From this it is also explained how it happens, that taste, as a faculty of judgment of beauty, steps into the middle between mind and sense, and connects these two natures, each scornful of the other, in happy concord: as it teaches *matter* respect for reason, it also teaches that which is *rational* its sympathy for sensuousness; as it ennobles perceptions into ideas, it transforms the world of sense in a certain way into a realm of freedom.

But, in respect of the object itself, it is fortuitous, whether reason connects an idea of the object with one of its ideas, yet—for the imagining subject—it is necessary to connect with one such image one such idea. This idea and the sensuous characteristic of its object corresponding to it

must stand in such a relationship with each other, that reason is compelled to this operation by its own unalterable laws. The cause must lie in reason itself, why it connects a certain idea exclusively only with a *certain* way of appearance of things, and the cause must lie in the object, why it only calls forth exclusively *this idea* and no other. What kind of idea that might be, which reason implants in a thing of beauty, and by means of which objective characteristic the beautiful object might be capable of serving as symbol to this idea—this is a far too important question to be answered here merely in passing, and so I defer its explication to an analysis of beauty.

The architectonic beauty of man is, therefore, in the manner just mentioned, *the sensuous expression of a concept of reason*; but it is this in no other sense and with no greater right than any other beautiful form of nature in general. *In degree* it indeed surpasses all other things of beauty, but in kind, it is of the same rank, since it too reveals nothing of its subject but what is sensuous, and only receives a supra-sensuous significance in its conception.¹

That the presentation of purposes turned out more beautifully than in other organic forms, is to be regarded as a *favor*, which reason, the legislator of the human frame, rendered unto nature, the executor of reason's laws. Reason, indeed, in the technology of man, pursues its purposes with strict necessity, but its demands fortunately *coincide* with the necessity of nature, so that the latter carries out the mission of the former, in that she performs merely according to her own inclination.

This, however, can only hold good of the *architectonic* beauty of man, where natural necessity is supported by the necessity of the teleological cause which directs it. Only here was it possible to *set* beauty *in account* against the technology of the construction, which no longer occurs, as soon as necessity is only one-sided and the supra-sensuous cause of phenomena changes fortuitously. Nature *alone* thus provides for the architectonic beauty of man, because here, at once in the first design, the execution of everything which

man *requires* to fulfill his purposes was surrendered to her once and for all by creating reason, and she therefore need fear no innovation in this, her *organic* business.

But man is at the same time a *person*, thus a creature who can be *himself* cause, who can, according to the grounds he takes from himself, change himself. The manner of his appearance is dependent upon the manner of his sentience, and willing, himself in freedom, and not nature according to her necessity.

Were man merely a sensuous creature, then had nature at once dictated the *laws* and determined the *cases* of their application; now she shares the domain with freedom, and, although the laws endure, now the mind decides upon the cases.

The domain of mind extends *as far as nature lives*, and ends not sooner than where organic life loses itself in formless mass, and the forces of life cease. It is known, that all forces in man are interconnected with each other, and so it is understood how mind—even considered only as principle of willful movement—can propagate its effects through his entire system. Not merely the tools of the will, also those over which the will has no immediate command, experience at least indirectly its influence. The mind resolves them not merely intentionally when it acts, rather also unintentionally when it experiences.

Nature by herself, as is clear from the above, can only provide for the beauty of those phenomena which she alone, without limitation, determines according to the laws of necessity. But with *willfulness*, *chance* enters her Creation, and although the changes which she suffers under the authority of freedom do not succeed according to any other laws but her own, they do not issue *from* those laws. Since it depends upon mind, what use it wants to make of its tools, nature can have no authority any longer over that part of beauty which depends upon its use, and hence can no longer be held accountable.

And so, where he elevates himself through use of his freedom to pure intelligence, man would be in danger of being degraded as appearance, and losing in the judgment of taste, what he gained before the seat of reason's judgment. The destiny *fulfilled* by his action would cost him an advantage merely *presaged* in his frame, which destiny had favored; and although this advantage is only sensuous, yet we have found, that reason bestows upon it a higher significance. It is not concord-loving nature who makes herself guilty of such a crude contradiction, and what is harmonious in the domain of reason, will not manifest itself by discord in the world of sense.

While thus the person, or the free principle in man, takes it upon himself to decide the play of phenomena, and by his intervention takes from nature the power to protect the beauty of her works, so he himself steps into the place of nature, and assumes (if I be permitted this expression) together with her rights, a part of her responsibilities. While the mind implicates the sensuousness subordinated to it in its own fate, and lets it depend upon its conditions, it makes itself into a phenomenon to a certain degree, and thus acknowledges itself to be a subject of the law to which all phenomena are subject. And for its own sake, the mind undertakes the obligation to permit nature, dependent upon it, to remain nature, though yet in the service of *mind*, and never to treat her *contrary* to her former duty. I call beauty a *duty* of phenomena, because the requirement corresponding to it in the subject is grounded in reason itself, and is therefore general and necessary. I call it a *former* duty, because sense has already judged, before understanding sets out upon its business.

Freedom thus now governs beauty. Nature provided beauty of form, the soul bequeaths beauty of play. And now we also know what we are to understand by charm and grace. Grace is beauty of frame under the influence of freedom: the beauty of those phenomena upon which the person decides. Architectonic beauty does honor to the

Author of nature, charm and grace honor him who possesses them. The one is *talent*, the latter a *personal* merit.

Grace can belong only to *movement*, since a change in heart can proclaim itself only as movement in the world of sense. But this does not prevent firm and calm lines from manifesting grace. These firm lines were originally nothing but movements, which, by repetition, became habitual, and left their lasting traces.²

But not all movements which a person makes are capable of grace. Grace is always solely the beauty of the *form moved by freedom*, and movements *which merely belong to nature* can never deserve this name. It is indeed true, that a lively mind ultimately becomes the master of nearly all movements of its body, but if the chain becomes very long, whereby a beautiful contour joins itself to moral sentiments, it then becomes a characteristic of the frame, and can hardly any longer be accounted to grace. Ultimately the mind *forms* itself a body, and the frame must follow the *play*, so that in the end grace not seldom transforms itself into architectonic beauty.

Just as a hostile mind, at odds with itself, destroys even the most exalted beauty of form, so that under the hand unworthy of freedom we can finally no longer recognize the magnificent masterpiece of nature, so we also occasionally see the merry and harmonious heart come to the aid of a technology fettered by obstacles, to set nature free and scatter even the developed, impressed form with divine glory. The formative nature of man has infinitely many resources within it to harvest nature's shortcomings, and improve her mistakes, if but the moral spirit supports her in her forming work, or sometimes, too, wants not to disrupt it.

Since *congealed movements* (gestures transformed into contours) are not excluded from grace, it might, on the whole, seem as if the beauty of *apparent* or *imitated* movements (veined or serpentine lines) must also be accounted to grace, as Mendelssohn actually claims.³ But that would extend the concept of grace to the concept of beauty as such;

for *all* beauty is ultimately only a characteristic of a true or apparent (objective or subjective) movement, as I hope to have proven in the explication of beauty. Only such movements can manifest grace, which at once correspond to an emotion.

The person—it is clear what I mean by this—prescribes movements to the body either by his will, if he wants to realize an intended effect in the sensuous world, and in this case the movements are called *willful* or deliberate; or, movements occur without the will of the person, according to a law of necessity, but on the inducement of an emotion. These I call *sympathetic* movements. Although the latter are involuntary and grounded in an emotion, we must not confuse them with those which the moral faculty of sentiment and instinct directs; for instinct is no free principle, and what it accomplishes is no deed of a person. By sympathetic movements, which is what we speak of here, I therefore only want to have those understood, which serve to accompany moral sentiment or moral disposition.

The question now arises, which of these two kinds of movement founded in the person is capable of grace?

That which one must distinguish in philosophizing, is not therefore always distinguished in reality. We thus find deliberate movements seldom unattended by sympathetic ones, because the will, the cause of *the former*, attunes itself according to moral sentiment, from which *the latter* issue. While a person is speaking, we see at once his glances, facial contours, his hands, indeed often the entire body *speaking along*, and the *mimical* part of the conversation is not seldom deemed the most convincing. But even a deliberate movement can at the same time be considered sympathetic, and this happens, when something involuntary interferes with what is willful in the movement.

The way and manner in which a willful movement is performed is not so precisely attuned by its purpose, that there may not be numerous ways in which it can be accomplished. Now, what is left unsettled by the will or the purpose can be sympathetically attuned by the *sentient*

condition of the person, and thus serves to express that condition. While I extend my arm to receive an object, I thus fulfill a purpose, and the movement I make is directed by the intention which I thereby want to achieve. But *how* I take my arm to the object and how far I wish to let my body follow, how quickly or slowly, and with how great or how little expenditure of force I want to accomplish the movement—I do not entertain this precise accounting at *that* moment, and something is left to nature in me. But in one way, and one manner or other, that which is not attuned by the mere purpose must be decided, and it is thus here, that my manner of sentiment can settle the issue, and by the *tone* which it sets, attune the kind and mode of movement. Now, the part which the sentient condition of the person takes in a willful movement, is its involuntary part, and is also that wherein one has to seek the Graces.

A *willful* movement, if it does not at the same time combine with a sympathetic one, or, which is to say as much, does not mingle with something *involuntary* which has its ground in the moral sentient condition of the person, can *never* manifest *grace*, for which a sentient condition is always required as the cause. The willful movement *succeeds* upon an act of sentiment, which is also past when the movement ensues.

The sympathetic movement, on the other hand, *accompanies* the act of sentiment and its sentient condition, on account of which it is enabled to this act, and must, therefore, be considered as *running parallel* to both.

From this it is evident, that the willful movement which does not immediately flow from the disposition of the person, also cannot be a manifestation of that disposition. For, between the disposition and the movement steps the *resolution*, which, taken for itself, is a matter of indifference; the movement is the effect of a *decision* and of the purpose, but not of the *person* and his disposition.

Willful movement is fortuitously connected with the preceding disposition, whereas the accompanying (sympathetic movement) is necessarily connected to it. The former

stands to sentiment as the conventional signs of speech stand to the thought which they express; sympathetic or accompanying movement are to sentiment, what the passionate tone is to passion. The former, therefore, is not a manifestation of mind by *nature*, but merely of the use to which it is put. Hence, we cannot say, that *mind* reveals itself in a willful movement, for this movement only expresses the *material of will* (the purpose) but not the *form of will* (the disposition). About the latter only the accompanying movement can teach us.⁴

We will be able to conclude, therefore, from the speeches of a person, what *he wants to be held for*, but what *he really is*, we must try to glean from the mimical presentation of his words and from his gestures, thus from movements *which he does not will*. But when one learns, that a person can also *will* his facial expressions, one will not long trust his face from the moment of this discovery, and will no longer take his face for an expression of his disposition.

Now a person may, through art and study, at last succeed, to the extent, that he also subjects the accompanying movements to his will, and, like a skillful magician, can let what form he will fall upon the mimical mirror of his soul. But about such a person everything is a lie, and nature is devoured entirely by art. Grace, on the other hand, must always be nature, i.e., involuntary (or at least seem so), and the subject itself must never look as though *it knew about its grace*.

From this one sees, in passing, what one is to think of *imitated* or *learned* grace (which I would like to call theatrie, or dance-master grace). It is a worthy counterpart to that *beauty* which issues from the dressing table from rouge and bleach, wigs, false breasts, and girdles, and is related in approximately the same way to true grace as *toilette beauty* is to *architectonic beauty*.⁵

But although grace must be, or appear to be, something unwilling, yet we seek it only among movements which, more or less, depend upon the will. In fact, one attributes

grace to a certain gesture language, and speaks of a graceful smile and a charming flush of color, both of which are but sympathetic movements, whereupon not will, but sentiment decides. Leaving aside that each is in our power, and that it can still be doubted, whether these also belong to grace, still there are by far more numerous cases from the domain of willful movements where grace manifests itself. One demands grace of speech and song, of the willful play of the eyes and mouth, of the movement of the hands and arms, in each free use of the same, of the gait, of the posture of the body, and of position, insofar as it is in a person's power. Of those movements of men which are due to instinct, or an affect which has seized mastery over the person to execute the movement *on its own*, and which in respect of their origin are sensuous, we require something entirely different than grace, as will be discovered hereafter. Such movements belong to *nature* and not to the *person*, from whom alone all grace must spring.

If, therefore, grace is a characteristic which we require of willful movements, and if, on the other hand, everything willful must be banned from grace, then we shall have to seek it out in that which is unintentional in intentional movements, the which also corresponds to a moral cause in sentiment.

This merely characterizes the species of movements among which one must seek grace; but a movement can have all of these characteristics without being graceful. Movement is thereby merely *speaking* (mimical).

I call every manifestation of a body, speaking (in the broadest sense), which accompanies a sentient condition, and expresses it. In this sense, therefore, all sympathetic movements are speaking, even those which accompany mere affects of sensuousness.

Animal forms, too, speak, in that internal processes are outwardly manifest. But here it is mere *nature* that speaks, never *freedom*. In the permanent form and firm architectonic contours of the animal, nature proclaims her *purpose*, in the mimical lines the aroused or satisfied

need. The ring of necessity passes through the animal as through the plant, without being interrupted by a *person*. The individuality of its existence is only a specific manifestation of a general concept of nature; the particularity of its present condition merely an example of the execution of one of nature's purposes under certain natural conditions. Only the human form is speaking in the *narrower* sense, and it is this, also, only in those of its manifestations which accompany moral sentient condition of the person, and serve as its expression.

Only in *these* manifestations: for in all others, man stands in the same rank with other creatures of sense. In his permanent form and in his architectonic contours, nature displays, as she does with animals and all organic creatures, her intention. The intention nature has with him can indeed reach further than with them, and the combination of means to fulfill that intention be more artful and intricate; all of this is only accounted to *nature*, and can redound to no credit of a person.

Among animals and plants, nature not only sets the tone, *she alone also implements it*. For man she sets the tone, and also leaves its composition to him. This alone makes him into man.

Man alone, as person, has the prerogative over all known creatures to intercede by means of his will into the ring of necessity, which for a mere creature of nature is unbreakable, and to begin an entirely fresh series of manifestations in himself. The act through which he effects this is called preeminently an *intervention* and those of his accomplishments, which flow from such *intervention*, exclusively, his *deeds*. He can prove, therefore, that he is a person only through his deeds.

The animal form expresses not merely the conception of its purpose, but also the relation of its present condition to this purpose. Now since, among animals, nature sets the purpose, and at the same time fulfills it, the form of the animal can, therefore, never express anything but the work of nature.

Since nature provides for the purpose of man, but *places* its fulfillment into *his will*, the present relationship of his condition to his destiny can, therefore, not be the work of nature, but must be his own work. Thus, the expression of this relationship in his form belongs not to nature, but directly to himself; that is, it is a personal expression. If, therefore, we learn from the architectonic part of his form ~~what nature has intended with him, we then learn from the mimical part of his form what he himself has done to fulfill this intention.~~

In respect of the form of man, therefore, we are not satisfied, that it present us merely the general conception of mankind, or what *nature* effected in the fulfillment of that conception with this individual, for that much he would have in common with every technical form. We expect from his form, that it reveal to us at the same time how far he is come, in his freedom, to fulfill nature's purpose: that is, that it bespeak his character. We see in him, in the first case, that nature *aimed* at man, but only from the second is it evident, whether he is really *become* one.

Thus, man's form is only *his*, insofar as it is mimical; but also, *the more mimical it is*, the more it is *his*. Since, even were the greater part of these mimical lines, yea although all of them, merely the expression of sensuousness, and might hence belong to him as a mere beast, he was yet so attuned as to be capable of limiting sensuousness by his freedom. The presence of such lines proves, therefore, the non-use of that faculty, and the non-fulfillment of his destiny; it is, therefore, speaking morally, to the same extent as the omission of an act dictated by duty is itself an act.

From the speaking lines, which are always an expression of the soul, we must distinguish the mute ones which mere forming nature draws in the human form, insofar as it works its effect independently of any influence of the soul. I call these lines *mute*, because, as incomprehensible ciphers of nature, they say nothing about character. They merely display the idiosyncracy of nature in the presentation of the species, and by themselves are often sufficient to distinguish

the *individual*, but about the *person* they can never reveal anything. For physiognomists these mute lines are by no means void of meaning, because the physiognomist wants to know not only what the man has made of himself, but also, what nature has done for and against him.

Hence, it is not an easy matter, to determine the limits at which the mute lines cease and the speaking ones begin. The uniformly working formative force and the lawless affect incessantly battle over the terrain; and what *nature* constructed in tireless, quiet activity, is often torn asunder by *freedom*, which, like a swelling river, washes over her banks. A lively mind obtains influence over *all* bodily movements, and ultimately succeeds, indirectly, in changing even the fixed forms of nature, which are unreachable by the will, through the power of sympathetic play. With such a person, everything becomes a feature of his character, as we find with many heads, who have fully *worked through* a long life, extraordinary fortunes, and an active mind. In such forms, only the *generic* belongs to formative nature, but the *individuality* of the elaboration belongs to the person; for that reason, one says quite rightly of such a form, that everything is soul.

By contrast, those fashioned students of the *rule* (who indeed bring sensuousness to rest, but are incapable of awakening humanity) demonstrate to us, in their flat and expressionless form, everywhere nothing but the finger of nature. The idle soul is a modest guest in its body and a peaceful, quiet neighbor of the forming powers left to themselves. No strenuous thought, no passion reaches its grip into the calm rhythm of physical life; never is the *edifice* endangered by *play*, never the vegetation upset by freedom. Since the profound quietude of the mind causes no very considerable consumption of energy, so shall the expenditure never surpass the income; animal economy shall instead always show a surplus. For the meager wage of happiness which she casts to him, such a mind is the punctual housekeeper of nature, and its entire glory is to keep her *ledger* in order. That shall be accomplished, there-

fore, which organization can always accomplish, and the business of nutrition and procreation will flourish. Such fortunate concord between natural necessity and freedom can not but be conducive to architectonic beauty, and it is here that she can be observed in her full purity. But the forces of nature, as we know, wage perpetual war with what is particular, or organic, and artful technology is ultimately defeated by *cohesion* and *gravity*. For that reason, too, beauty of form, as a *mere product of nature*, has its particular golden age of maturity and decay, which indeed accelerates the play, but can never arrest it; and its customary end is, that *mass* gradually becomes master over *form*, and the vital impulse toward form in preserved matter digs its own grave.⁶

While no *single* mute line is an expression of mind, such a silent form, *as a whole*, is characteristic; and indeed for the same reason, that a sensuous line is a speaking one. The mind, to wit, should be active and should be morally sentient; it thus testifies to its failing, if its form leaves no trace of its work. Hence, if the pure and beautiful expression of his destiny in the architecture of his form fills us with pleasure, and even awe, of the most supreme reason as its cause, then shall both sentiments remain unmixed only so long as it is a mere product of nature for us. But, if we think of him as a moral person, then we are justified in expecting that this be expressed in his form, and if this expectation is disappointed, scorn will inevitably follow. Merely organic things are worthy of our respect as *creatures*, the person can only be so as *creator* (i.e., as self-cause of his condition). He should not, as other creatures of sense, reflect the beams of foreign reason, even were it the Divine; rather, like a star, he should glow of his own light.

Thus, we demand a speaking form of man once we become conscious of his moral purpose; but, at the same time, it must be a form which bespeaks his advantage, i.e., a sentient faculty commensurate with his purpose, which expresses a moral faculty. This demand reason makes upon the human form.

But, at the same time, man, as a phenomenon, is an object of sense. Where *moral* sentiment finds satisfaction, the *aesthetical* does not want to be cut short, and concord with an idea must not cost a sacrifice in the appearance. However sternly reason may demand an expression of morality, just as persistently will the eye require beauty. Since both these demands befall the same object, albeit from diverse standpoints of judgment, then satisfaction for both must be provided by one and the same cause. That sentient condition of the person, by which he is most capable of fulfilling his destiny as a moral person, must allow of such an expression, which is also most advantageous to him. In other words, grace must bespeak his moral faculties.

It is here that the chief difficulty arises. It follows from the very notion of morally speaking movements, that they must have a moral cause which lies outside the world of sense; it follows, as well, from the notion of beauty, that she has nothing but a sensuous cause, and must be, or yet seem to be, a completely free effect of nature. But if the final cause of morally speaking movements necessarily lies *without*, while the final cause of beauty necessarily lies *within* the world of sense, then the *Graces*, which are supposed to connect them both, seem to contain an evident contradiction.

In order to resolve it, we will need to assume, that the moral cause in sentiment, which is the cause of grace, must necessarily bring forth just that condition, which contains within it the *natural conditions* of beauty in sensuousness, which depends upon it. Beauty, that is to say, presupposes certain conditions, which is evident of all sensuous things, and, insofar as it is beauty, only sensuous conditions. Now, that the mind prescribes this condition to accompanying nature (according to a law, which we cannot fathom), by the condition in which it finds itself, and that the condition of moral preparedness in the mind is just that through which the sensuous conditions of beauty are brought to fulfillment, makes beauty therewith *possible*, and that alone is the intervention of the mind. But, that beauty is actually begotten

of this operation, is the consequence of those sensuous conditions, and thus a *free effect of nature*. But, since nature in *willful* movements, where she is treated as a means to accomplish a purpose, cannot actually be called free, and because *unwillful* movements which express morality also cannot be called free, then the freedom by which she expresses herself, nevertheless in dependency on the will, is a *concession on the part of the mind*. We can therefore say, that grace is a *favor* which morality grants to sensuousness, just as architectonic beauty may be considered the *gift* of nature to her technical form.

Permit me to illustrate this by means of an analogy. If a monarchic state be so administered, that, although everything happens according to one single will, yet the individual citizen can convince himself, that he lives according to his own inclination, then we call this a liberal government. But, one would have considerable reservations, either if the regent asserted his will against the inclination of the citizen, or if the citizen asserted his inclination against the will of the regent; for in the first case, the government were not *liberal*, in the second, it were no *goverment* at all.

It is not difficult to apply this to the human form under the regime of the mind. If the mind expresses itself in sensuous nature, which depends upon it, in such a way, that nature accomplishes the mind's will most faithfully, and expresses its sentiments most speakingly, yet without violating the demands which sense makes of her, the which it makes of all phenomena, then that which we call grace will ensue. But, we would be far from calling it grace, if either the mind manifest itself in sensuousness by force, or if the free effect of sensuousness fail to express the mind. For in the first case, there were no beauty, and in the second, it were no beauty of play.

It is, therefore, always only the supra-sensuous cause in sentiment which makes grace speak, and always only a merely sensuous cause in nature which makes grace beautiful. We can just as little say, that the mind *produces* beauty, as we can say of the ruler in the cited analogy,

that he *creates* freedom, for freedom one may *allow*, but not *grant*.

But yet, just as the reason why a people may feel free under the force of an alien will, lies for the most part in the disposition of the ruler, and a contrary way of thinking would not be very conducive to freedom, for the same reason, we must seek out the beauty of free movements in the moral constitution of the mind which directs them. And now the question arises, what kind of *personal constitution* this might be, which concedes the greater freedom to the sensuous tools of the will, and what kind of moral sentiments best accord with beauty of expression?

This much is evident, that neither the will in respect of deliberate movements, nor emotion in respect of sympathetic movements, may conduct itself as a force against nature, which depends upon it, if she is to accord with beauty. Already the general opinion of mankind makes *ease* the chief characteristic of grace, and whatever requires effort can never manifest ease. It is equally evident, on the other hand, that nature must not conduct itself as a force against the mind, if a beautiful moral expression is to occur, for where mere nature *rules*, humanity must vanish.

In all, three relations are conceivable, in which the person may stand to himself, that is, his sensuous to his rational nature. We must seek that among these relations, which best cloaks him in his appearance, and whose manifestation is beauty.

Either the person represses the demands of his sensuous nature to conduct himself in concord with the higher demands of his reasonable nature; or he reverses this relationship, and subordinates the reasonable part of his being to the sensuous part, and thus merely follows the thrust with which the necessity of nature drives him on, just like other phenomena; or the impulses of natural necessity place themselves in harmony with the laws of reason, and the person is at one with himself.

If a person becomes conscious of his pure autonomy, he thrusts everything sensuous from him, and only by this

distinction from matter will he attain to the feeling of his rational freedom. But, because sensuousness stubbornly and powerfully resists, a marked force and effort is required of him, without which it were impossible for him to hold off the appetites and silence insistently urging instinct. A mind so attuned lets nature, which depends upon him, learn, that he is her master in those cases where she acts in service of his will, as well as where she wants to encroach upon his will. Sensuousness, therefore, under his strict discipline, will appear to be suppressed, and inner resistance will outwardly betray itself as coercion. Hence, such a constitution of sentiment, in which moral freedom shows itself struggling with matter, cannot be conducive to beauty, which nature brings forth by no other means than her freedom, and this constitution, therefore, also cannot become grace.

If, on the other hand, the person, subjugated by needs, allows natural instinct unfettered rule over himself, then, along with his inner autonomy, every trace of freedom in his form vanishes as well. Only bestiality speaks forth from the rolling, glassy eye, the lusting, open mouth, the strangled, trembling voice, the quickly gasping breath, the trembling limbs, from the entire flaccid form. All resistance of moral power has given way, and nature in him is set in total freedom. But, just this total cessation of self-activity, which usually ensues in the moment of sensuous longing, and even more in the enjoyment of it, also sets raw matter, previously constrained by the balance of active and passive forces, momentarily free. The dead forces of nature begin to take the upper hand over the living ones of organization; form begins to be repressed by mass, humanity by common nature. The soul-beaming eye becomes lustreless, or stares glassily and *vacant* out of its socket; the fine, rosy color of the cheeks thickens into a coarse and uniform bleaching flush; the mouth becomes a mere hole, since its form is no longer the effect of active, but of waning forces; the voice and sighing breath, nothing but noises, by means of which the heavy chest seeks relief, and betrays now merely a mechanical need, but no soul. In a word: with the freedom which

sensuousness usurps unto itself, beauty is inconceivable. The freedom of forms, which the moral will had merely *confined*, *overwhelms* the coarse material, which always wins as much of the the field as is torn away from the will.

A person in this condition outrages not merely *moral* sensibility, which unyieldingly demands the expression of humanity; the *aesthetical* sensibility, too, which satisfies itself not with mere matter, rather seeks free pleasure in the form, will turn away in disgust from such a sight, in which only *lusts* can find their account.

The first of these relationships between the two natures in a person reminds us of a *monarchy*, where the strict supervision of the ruler holds every impulse in check; the second, of a wild *ochlocracy*, where the citizens become as little free by suspension of their obedience, as the human form becomes beautiful by the suppression of moral autonomy, rather fall under the sway of the more brutal despotism of the lowest classes, just as the form is subjugated to mass. Just as freedom lies in the middle between *lawful* suasion and anarchy, so we shall now find beauty, too, in the middle between *dignity*, as the expression of the ruling mind, and *wantonness*, as the expression of the ruling instincts.

If, that is, neither *reason*, *ruling over sensuousness*, nor *sensuousness*, *ruling over reason*, accords with beauty of expression, then shall that sentient condition (for there is no fourth case), *where reason and sensuousness*, duty and inclination, *accord with each other*, be the condition under which beauty of play ensues.

In order to become an object of desire, obedience to reason must give us cause to take pleasure in it, for instinct is only set in motion by pleasure and pain. In usual experience, it is indeed the reverse, and pleasure is considered the cause wherefore one acts reasonably. For the fact that morality itself has finally ceased to speak this language, we have to thank the immortal author of the *Critique*, to whom the honor is due to have reestablished healthy reason out of philosophizing reason.

But, in the way the principles of this philosopher are usually presented by him, and also by others, inclination is a very ribald companion of moral sentiment, and pleasure, a regrettable supplement to moral principles. Although the impulse to happiness claims no blind rule over men, it still wants to *have something to say* in the moral business of choice, and thus taints the purity of will, which ought always to follow only the *law* and never an *impulse*. In order, therefore, to be absolutely certain, that inclination not take part, one would rather see it at war with, rather than in accord with the laws of reason, because it might all too easily happen, that the approving intercession of inclination might procure it powers over the will. Since the lawfulness of deeds is not at issue in moral acts, rather only the dutifulness of disposition, one rightly places no value on the consideration, that it might be more to the credit of moral acts, if inclination found itself on the same side as duty. This much, therefore, appears to be certain: that the applause of sensuousness, while it casts no suspicion on the dutifulness of the will, is at least *no guarantee* of a dutiful disposition. The sensuous expression of this approval in grace, will never provide sufficient and valid testimony of the morality of the act with which it is met, and from the beautiful presentation of a disposition or act, one will never learn of its moral value.

As certainly as I am convinced, and just because I am, that the share which inclination has in a free act proves nothing about the dutifulness of this act, I believe, that I may conclude *from this*, that the moral perfection of a person can be manifest only in the share which his inclination takes in his moral action. That is to say, it is not man's purpose, to accomplish individual moral acts, but to be a moral creature. Not *virtues*, but *virtue* is his precept, and Virtue is nothing else than "an inclination to duty." As much as deeds performed from inclination and deeds performed from duty stand opposed to each other, this is not so in the subjective sense, and the person not only *may*, in fact he *must* bring desire and duty into connection: he should obey his reason with joy. Not to cast it away, as a burden, nor to

strip it off like a coarse casing, no, to bring it into innermost agreement with his higher self, to this end is a sensuous nature placed beside his pure intellectual nature. In that she made him a reasonable sensuous creature, that is, man, nature announces to him the obligation not to divide asunder what she brought together, not even in the purest expression of his divine part to leave the sensuous part behind, and not to found the triumph of the one on the repression of the other. Only when it flows forth *from his entire humanity* as the united effect of both principles, *when it has become nature for him*, is his moral way of thinking secure from danger. For, so long as the moral mind still applies *force*, natural impulse must still have power to set against it. The enemy merely cast down can arise again, the reconciled is truly vanquished.

In Kantian moral philosophy, the idea of *duty* is presented with a severity which frightens all the Graces away, and a weak reason might easily attempt to seek moral perfection on the path of a gloomy and monkish asceticism.* As much as the great philosopher sought to guard against this misinterpretation, which of all things must be an outrage to his cheerful and free mind, yet it seems to me, that he himself, by the strict and harsh opposition of the two principles working upon the will of a person, gave a strong (although, given his intention, hardly avoidable) inducement to it. On the matter itself, after the proofs he has provided, there can be no argument among thinking minds *who want to be convinced*, and I hardly know how one would not rather surrender his entire humanity, than to want to obtain a different result from reason in this affair. But, as pure as his approach to the *investigation* of the truth was, and as much as everything here explains itself on the basis of merely objective reasons, he yet seems, in the representation of the truth he found, to have been guided by a more subjective maxim, which, as I believe, is not difficult to explain from the circumstances of the time.

Such was the condition of the morality of his time, as he found it in its system and practice, a crude materialism

in moral principles on the one hand, which an unworthy complacency of the philosophers had placed like a pillow under the head of the flaccid character of the time, must have aroused his indignation. On the other hand, a no less questionable *principle of perfection*, which, in order to realize an abstract idea of general world perfection, was not very particular about the choice of means, necessarily aroused his attention. He thus aimed the strongest of his arguments where the danger appeared greatest, and reform, most urgent, made it unto a law, to ruthlessly prosecute sensuousness, both where with brazen impudence it flouts moral sentiment, as well as in the imposing shell of morally laudable purposes, wherein especially a certain enthusiastic monastic mind knows how to conceal it. He had not to instruct *ignorance*, rather to rebuke *perversity*. Violent emotions require the *cure*, not ingratiation and persuasion; and the more severe the contrast which the principle of truth made with prevailing maxims, the more could he hope to stimulate reflection about it. He became a Draco of his time, because to him it seemed not yet worthy and receptive of a Solon. From the sanctuary of *pure reason* he brought forth the alien and yet well-known moral law, and put it on exhibition in its full sanctity before the disgraced century, and inquired little, whether there be eyes, which do not endure its brightness.

But, whereof were the *children of the house* to blame, that he only cared for the *servants*. Because often very impure inclinations usurp the name of virtue, must, on that account, the magnanimous sentiment in the most noble breast be made suspect? Because the moral weakling would like to give the moral law of reason a *laxity* which makes it the toy of his *convenience*, must it therefore be infused with a *rigidity* which transforms the most powerful expression of moral freedom into a merely more glorious kind of slavery? For, has the truly moral person a freer choice between self-esteem and self-condemnation, than the slave of sensuousness between pleasure and pain? Is there then less compulsion for the pure will, than for the corrupted? Must human-

ity be indicted and degraded by the *imperative* form of moral law, and the most noble document of its greatness be at once the testament to its infirmity? Was it to be avoided in this imperative form, that a precept, which man, as a creature of reason, gives unto himself, which on that account alone binds him, and on that account alone accords with his feeling of freedom, took on the semblance of an alien and positive law—a semblance, which, by its *radical* bias, could hardly diminish the impulse (in that it makes him guilty) to act against that very precept?^{7†}

It is certainly no advantage for moral truths to have emotions, to which a person may admit without blushing, *against* them. But, how shall sentiments of beauty and freedom be compatible with the austere spirit of a law, which guides a person more through *fear* than *confidence*, which, although nature *had made him one*, yet always seeks to dismember him, and assures itself dominance over part of his essence only for that reason, that it awakens in him distrust of another? Human nature is a more interconnected whole in reality, than the philosopher, who can achieve something only by dissection, is allowed to let it manifest itself. Never more may reason castigate such emotions as unworthy of itself, which the heart gleefully confesses, and never more may a man, where he were morally degraded, still not rise in his own esteem. Were sensuous nature in morality always only the repressed and never a *collaborating party*, how could she surrender the entire fire of her emotions to a triumph which she celebrates over herself? How could she be a so lively participant in the self-consciousness of a pure mind, were she not capable of so fervently joining with it, that the analytical understanding itself were no longer capable of separating them without violence?

The will, all the same, has a more direct connection with the faculty of sentiment than with knowledge, and it were in many cases bad if it first had to orient itself by *pure reason*. It awakens in me no good judgment of a person if he can trust the voice of impulse so little, that he is com-

elled to interrogate it first before the court of morality; instead, one will esteem him more, if he trusts his impulses with a certain confidence, without danger of being misguided by them. For that proves, that both principles in him find themselves already in that concord which is the seal of perfected humanity, and is that which we understand by a *beautiful soul*.

We call it a beautiful soul, when moral sentiment has assured itself of all emotions of a person ultimately to that degree, that it may abandon the guidance of the will to emotions, and never run danger of being in contradiction with its own decisions. Hence, in a beautiful soul individual deeds are not properly moral, rather, the entire character is. Nor can one add any individual deed to its account of merit, because the satisfaction of an impulse can never be called meritorious. The beautiful soul has no other merit, than that it is. With such ease, as if mere instinct were acting out of it, it carries out the most painful duties of humanity, and the most heroic sacrifice which it exacts from natural impulse comes to view like a voluntary effect of just this impulse. Hence, the beautiful soul knows nothing of the beauty of its deeds, and it no longer occurs to it, that one could act or feel differently; a trained student of moral rules, on the other hand, just as the word of the master requires of him, will be prepared at every moment to give the strictest account of the relationship of his action to the law. His life will be like a drawing, where one sees the rules marked by harsh strokes, such as, at best, an apprentice of the principles of art might learn. But, in a beautiful life, as in a painting by Titian, all of those cutting border lines have vanished, and yet the whole form issues forth the more true, vital, and harmonious.

It is thus in a beautiful soul, that sensuousness and reason, duty and inclination harmonize, and grace is its epiphany. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the same time possess freedom and preserve her form, since the former she forfeits under the rule of a strict sentience, the latter, under the anarchy of sensuousness. A

beautiful soul also infuses a form which is wanting of architectonic beauty, and one often sees it triumph even over frailties of nature. All movements which issue from her *grace* become light, soft, and yet vigorous. Merry and free shall the eye gleam, and therein emotions glow. From the gentleness of the heart shall the heart receive a grace such as no pretense can feign. There shall be no tension seen in gestures, no coercion in willful movements, for the soul knows of none. The voice shall become music, and move the heart with the pure flow of its modulations. Architectonic beauty may arouse pleasure, admiration, and amazement, but only grace can delight. Beauty has worshippers, only grace has lovers; for we worship the Creator, and love the person.

On the whole, one will find grace more in the female sex (beauty possibly more in the male), the cause of which is not far to seek. Bodily frame, as well as character, must contribute to grace; the former by its suppleness, to receive impressions and set them in play, and the latter by the moral harmony of feelings. In both, nature more favored woman than man.

The more tender female receives every impression more quickly, and lets it more quickly vanish once more. Firm constitutions come in motion only by a storm, and when strong muscles are tensed, they cannot manifest the ease which grace requires. That which is still beautiful sensitivity in a woman's face would already express suffering in that of a man. The most tender fiber of a woman bends like a thin reed under the softest breath of emotion. In light and lovely waves the soul glides over the speaking countenance, soon then smoothing into a calm mirror once again.

Also what the soul must contribute to grace, can be more easily fulfilled by woman than by man. Seldom will the female character elevate itself to the highest idea of moral purity, and seldom, furthermore, will it achieve more than an affected deed. The female character will often resist sensuousness with heroic strength, but *through* sensuousness. Since the morality of woman is usually on the side of

inclination, it will appear as if inclination were on the side of morality. Grace will therefore be the expression of female virtue, of which the male may often be wanting.

DIGNITY

Just as grace is the expression of a beautiful soul, *dignity* is the expression of a noble disposition of mind.

It is, indeed, the person's task to establish an intimate accord between his two natures, always to be a harmonizing whole, and act with his full-voiced entire humanity. But, this beauty of character, the ripest fruit of his humanity, is merely an idea, to be in accord with which, he must strive with persistent vigilance, but which, for all of his effort, he can never entirely achieve.

The reason why he can never achieve it lies in the inalterable constitution of his nature; it is the physical conditions of his very existence which prevent him.

In order, that is, to secure his existence in the world of sense, which depends on natural conditions, the person must (since, as a creature which can willfully change himself, he must provide for his subsistence himself) be enabled to deeds, whereby those physical conditions of his existence may be fulfilled, and if they fall to decay, reestablished. But, although nature had to surrender the task of providing for man, which in her vegetable productions she takes upon herself alone, yet the satisfaction of a so urgent need, where his and his entire species' existence is at stake, could not be entrusted to his uncertain insight. She therefore drew this matter, which in respect of *content* belongs in her domain, also in respect of *form* into the same, in that she laid necessity into the direction of willfulness. This was the genesis of instinct, which is nothing else, than a natural necessity through the medium of sentiment.

Instinct assails the sentient faculty through the double power of pain and pleasure: through pain, where it demands satisfaction, through pleasure where it finds it.

Since the necessity of nature brooks no concessions, man too, regardless of his freedom, must feel what nature wants him to feel, and accordingly, whether the feeling is of pain or of pleasure, there must unalterably ensue in him either abhorrence or desire. In this he is equivalent to an animal, and the most stubborn stoic will feel hunger and abhor it as fervently as the worm at his feet.

But, now the great difference begins. From desire and abhorrence among animals, action follows just as necessarily as desire ensued upon sensation, and sensation upon the outside impression. Here there is a chain, running ever onward, where every ring necessarily links into the other. Among mankind there is yet one more court, the will, which, as a supra-sensuous faculty, is subjugated neither to the law of nature, nor to that of reason, so that a totally free will remains, to direct itself according to the one or the other. The animal *must* strive to be rid of pain, a *person* can decide to keep it.

The will of man is a noble concept, also, when one pays no attention to its moral use. *Mere* will elevates man above beastliness; *moral* will elevates him to divinity. But, he must have left beastliness behind him, before he can approach divinity; hence, it is no small step toward the moral freedom of will, to break the necessity of nature in himself even in matters of no account, to exercise *mere* will.

The legislation of nature binds until it meets with the will, where it ceases and reason begins. Will here stands between both courts of law, and it alone decides from which it wants to receive the law; but will does not stand in the same relationship to both. As natural force, it is as free in respect of the one as the other; that means, it *need* not side with the one, nor with the other. But, it is not free as a moral force, which means, it *should* side with reason. It is not *bound* to either, but to the law of reason it is obliged. In fact, it therefore needs its freedom, even if it acts in contradiction to reason, but then it uses freedom basely, because, irrespective of its freedom, it still remains bound *within nature*, and makes no addition of reality to the opera-

tion of mere instinct; for, to *will* out of appetite, means only to desire with more effort.⁸

The legislation of nature through instinct can come into principled conflict with the legislation of reason, if instinct requires for its satisfaction an act which contradicts the moral principle. In this case, it is the immutable duty of the will, to pursue the demand of nature with the verdict of reason, since laws of nature oblige only conditionally, the laws of reason, however, absolutely and unconditionally.

But, nature vigorously claims her rights, and since she never makes demands fortuitously, she thus, unsatisfied, neither withdraws a demand. Since from the first cause, by means of which she is set in motion, until she meets with the will, where her legislation ceases, everything in her is strict necessity, she can therefore not *retreat* in surrender, but must always press *forward* against the will, which stands in the way of the fulfillment of her demand. It, in fact, sometimes seems as if she had shortened her course, and, without bringing her request before the will, it seems as if there were a direct causality for her action, through which she is redressed of her demands. In such a case, where the person not only let instinct take a free rein, rather, where instinct *seizes* the reins, the person were *only* animal; but it is very doubtful, whether this can ever be the case, and were he ever actually so, it is a question whether this blind power of his instinct is not, in fact, a crime of his will.

The faculty of desire insists on satisfaction, and the will is called upon to provide it. But, the will should receive its directing principle from reason, and only make a decision according to what reason allows or prescribes. If, now, the will, in fact, turns to reason before it approves the demands of instinct, then it acts morally; but if it decides directly, then it acts sensuously.⁹

Hence, as long as nature makes her demands, and wants to take the will by surprise by the blind force of emotion, it behooves the will to command nature to hold still until reason has spoken. Whether reason's verdict will turn out *for* or *against* the interests of sensuousness, that is just what

the will cannot yet know; but just for that reason, the will must follow this procedure in every emotion without exception, and deny to nature, in every case where she is the instigating element, direct causality. Only by breaking the force of desire, which with overhaste rushes toward its satisfaction, and would most like to scurry past the court of the will entirely, does man demonstrate his autonomy (independence), and prove himself a moral creature, which never merely desires nor merely abhors, but *must always want* his abhorrence and desire.

But, the mere inquiry of reason is already an encroachment on nature, who is a competent judge in her own affairs and will not see her verdicts subordinated to a new and alien jurisdiction. Each act of the will, which brings the affairs of the faculty of desire before the court of morality, is therefore, in reality, *contrary to nature*, because it makes something fortuitous out of what is necessary, and submits the decision to laws of reason in a matter where only laws of nature may speak, and have also actually spoken. For, as little as *pure reason* in its moral legislation considers how sense would like to receive its decisions, just as little does nature in her legislation take account of how she might justify herself to *pure reason*. In each of the two a different necessity holds sway, which, however, would be none at all, were one of them permitted to make fortuitous changes in the other.

For that reason, even the most courageous spirit, for all the resistance which he exercises against sensuousness, cannot repress emotion itself, desire itself, rather he can *merely* deny them influence upon the direction of his will; he can *disarm* instinct by moral means, but only *soothe* it by natural means. He can, by means of his independent power, prevent natural laws from becoming a compulsion for his will, but of these laws he himself can change absolutely nothing.

In emotions, therefore, where *first of all* nature (instinct) acts, and seeks either to *circumvent* the will entirely or to draw it violently to her side, morality of character

cannot express itself otherwise than through *resistance*, and, so that instinct not restrict freedom of will, only prevent it by restricting instinct. Accord with the laws of reason in emotions, therefore, is not otherwise possible than by contradiction of the demands of nature. And since nature never withdraws her demands for reasons of morality, everything consequently remains the same on her side, however the will, in view of that, may comport itself; there is, therefore, no congruity possible between inclination and duty, between reason and sensuousness, so that man here cannot act with the totality of his harmonizing nature, rather, exclusively and solely with his reasonable nature. In such cases, therefore, he also does not act *morally beautiful*, because inclination, too, must take part in the beauty of a deed, whereas here inclination is in conflict. But, he acts *morally great*, because all that, and only that is great, which testifies to the superiority of the higher faculty over the sensuous faculty.

The *beautiful* soul must, therefore, transform itself in emotion into a *noble* soul, and that is the unerring hallmark, whereby one can distinguish it from the *good heart* or *virtue of temperament*. If inclination in a person is only, therefore, on the side of justice, because justice fortunately finds itself on the side of inclination, then will the natural impulse in emotion exert a totally dominating force of compulsion over the will, and, where a sacrifice is necessary, morality and not sensuousness will bring it. If, on the other hand, it were reason itself which, as is the case in a beautiful character, binds inclination to the directions of *duty*, and *only entrusts* the rudder to sensuousness, then reason will take it back in the very moment when instinct wants to misuse its power. Virtue of temperament in emotion is, therefore, reduced to a mere product of nature; the beautiful soul passes over into the heroic, and elevates itself to pure intelligence.

Mastery of instinct by moral force is *freedom of mind*, and *dignity* is the name of its epiphany.

Strictly speaking, the moral force in man is capable of no representation, since that which is supra-sensuous can-

not be made sensuous. But, it can be indirectly represented to the understanding by sensuous signs, which is in fact the case with the dignity of the human form.

Aroused natural impulse, just as the heart in its moral emotions, is accompanied by movements in the body which partly rush ahead of the will, partly, as merely sympathetic movements, are not subject to its governance whatsoever. Since neither sentiment, nor desire and abhorrence, lie within the will of a person, he thus cannot exert command over those movements which are immediately connected to them. But, impulse does not remain standing at mere desire; precipitously and urgently it seeks to realize its object, and, if it is not insistently withheld by the independent mind, will itself *anticipate* such deeds, about which the will alone ought to speak. For the impulse to self-preservation wrestles incessantly for legislative authority in the realm of the will, and its endeavor is to rule as unfettered over man as it rules over animals.

Hence, one finds movements of two kinds and origins in each emotion, which enkindle the impulse to self-preservation in man; firstly such, which directly proceed from sentiment, and are unwillful; secondly such, which, according to their kind, ought to be and can be willful, but which the blind impulse of nature exacts from freedom. The first relate to the emotion itself, and are therefore necessarily connected to it; the second correspond more to the cause and object of emotion, and are therefore fortuitous and changeable, and cannot be taken to be infallible signs of the same. But, since both, as soon as the object is fixed, are necessarily equivalent to the impulse of nature, they each contribute, to make the expression of emotion a complete and harmonic whole.¹⁰

Now, if the will possesses sufficient independence to lay restraints on encroaching natural impulse, and to maintain against its furious power its own just power, so shall all those appearances remain in force which aroused natural impulse effected in its own domain, but all those shall now be lacking which, in the domain under the jurisdiction of another, it

had despotically wanted to usurp. The appearances are no longer in accord, but in their contradiction lies the expression of moral force.

Assume that we notice in a person signs of the most painful emotions from the class of those first entirely unwilling movements. But, while his veins swell, his muscles are cramped in tension, his voice is strangled, his chest swollen, **his belly pressed inward, gentle are his willful movements,** the lines of his face free, and his eyes and brow are joyful. Were the person merely a creature of sense, then all of his features would be in accord with one another, since they have a common source, and therefore they must all, in the present instance without exception, express suffering. But, since features of calm are mingled with features of pain, and since a single cause cannot have opposite effects, then this contradiction of features proves the existence and influence of a force which is independent of suffering, and superior to the impressions to which we see that which is sensuous succumb. And in this way, *calm in suffering*, wherein dignity actually consists, although only by a decision of reason, becomes the demonstration of intelligence in man and the expression of his moral freedom.¹¹

But, it is not merely in suffering in the narrow sense, where the word signifies only painful emotions, but at every moment the desiring faculty shows a strong interest, that the mind must prove its freedom, and thus dignity be its expression. The pleasant emotion requires it no less than the painful, since nature in both instances would gladly play the master, and ought to be reined in by the will. Dignity relates to the *form* and not to the *content* of emotion, for which reason it can happen, that often, in respect of the content, laudable emotions, if the person surrenders himself to them blindly, for lack of dignity, are reduced to the common and low; but not seldom, reprehensible emotions approximate to nobility, as soon as they bespeak mastery of the mind over its sentiments in respect of form.

In respect of dignity, therefore, the mind conducts itself in the body as *master*, for it is here that it must maintain its

independence against imperious impulse, which without it strikes to action, and would gladly cast off its yoke. In respect of grace, on the other hand, the mind governs *liberally*, for here it is the mind which sets nature into action, and finds no resistance to vanquish. But, only obedience deserves forbearance, and only *insubordination* can justly deserve sternness.

Hence, grace lies in the *freedom of willful movements*; *dignity in mastery over unwillful movements*. Grace inclines toward nature, where she carries out the commands of the mind, a semblance of the willful; where nature wants to rule, dignity subjugates her to the mind. Everywhere instinct begins to act, and makes so bold as to intercede into the office of the will, there may the will show no *indulgence*, rather must prove its independence (autonomy) by insistent resistance. Where, on the other hand, the will *begins*, and sensuousness *follows*, there may the mind show no sternness, and instead must show indulgence. This, in few words, is the law for the relationship of the two natures in man, just as it manifests itself in appearance.

Dignity is more required and manifest in *suffering* (pathos), grace more in ethos; for only in suffering can freedom of sentiment reveal itself, and the freedom of the body only in action.

Since dignity is an expression of resistance, which the independent mind exerts against natural impulse, this latter, therefore, necessarily viewed as a force which makes resistance necessary, so where there is no such force to be subdued, it is ridiculous, and where there ought no longer be such a force, contemptible. One laughs about the comedian (of whatever rank and station he might be), who affects a certain air of dignity even on occasions of no consequence. One has contempt for the small soul, who assumes the honor of dignity for the exercise of a common duty which is often only the omission of a base act.

On the whole, it is not in fact dignity, rather grace, that one demands of virtue. In the case of virtue, dignity comes of its own, which, in respect of its content, presupposes the

mastery of the person over his impulses. In the exercise of moral duties, moreover, sensuousness will find itself in a condition of coercion and repression, especially where a painful sacrifice must be made. But, since ideally perfect humanity requires, that there be no discord, but concord between the moral and the sensuous, so it is not commensurate with dignity, which, as an expression of the discord between the two, makes visible either the particular restraints of the subject, or the general ones of mankind.

If it is the former, and it is due merely to the incapacity of the subject, that inclination and duty in an act do not accord, so will this act always lose just so much in moral esteem as struggle mingles in its exercise, thus dignity in its execution. For our moral judgment applies the standard of the species to every individual, and there are no other restraints laid upon a person than those of humanity.

If it is the latter, and if a deed of duty cannot be brought into harmony with the demands of nature without annulling the conception of human nature, then resistance against inclination is necessary, and it is the sight of struggle which can convince us of the possibility of triumph. Here we therefore expect an expression of discord in the appearance, and will never permit ourselves to be convinced to believe in a virtue where we do not catch sight of humanity. Where, therefore, moral duty demands an act which necessarily makes sensuousness suffer, there everything is serious, and not play, there the ease of execution would outrage us more than please us; therefore, the expression cannot be grace, rather dignity. On the whole, the law holds here, that the person must do with grace everything which he can accomplish within his humanity, and with dignity everything, in order to accomplish the which, he must transcend his humanity.

Just as we require grace of virtue, so we also require dignity of inclination. Grace is as natural to inclination, as dignity is to virtue, for by its very content it is sensuous, favorably disposed to natural freedom, and adversary to all exertion. Even the coarse person does not lack a certain

degree of grace, if love or a similar emotion besouls him, and where do we find more grace than among children, who yet are entirely under the guidance of the senses? There is far more danger, that inclination makes the condition of suffering a prevailing one, which suffocates self-activity of the mind, and results in a general disability. In order, therefore, to attain to esteem in a noble feeling, which only a *moral* cause can provide to it, inclination must always ally itself to dignity. For that reason, the loving one expects dignity from the object of his passion. Dignity alone is his guarantee, that it was not desire which compelled the object of his passion toward him, rather, that it was freedom which chose him—that he is not *desired as a thing*, rather *esteemed highly as a person*.

One expects grace of him who demands a commitment, and dignity of him who makes one. The former, in order to avoid an insulting judgment of the other, ought to reduce the act of his disinterested decision by the share which he lets inclination take in it, to an *affected* act, and give himself the semblance of the victorious part. The other, in order not to dishonor humanity in his person (whose sacred palladium is freedom) by the dependency he enters, ought to elevate the mere *approach* of inclination into an act of his will, and in this way, by receiving a favor, grant one.

One must chastise a mistake with grace, and confess one with dignity. If one reverses it, it will seem as if the one too much appreciates his merit, and other, too little his failing.

If the strong will be loved, he shall soften his superiority by grace. If the weak will be esteemed, so may he succour his weakness with dignity. One is otherwise of the opinion, that dignity belongs upon the throne, and, as we know, those who sit on it, in their councils, confessionals, and parliaments, love—grace. But, what is perhaps good and laudable in a political kingdom, is not always so in the kingdom of taste. Into this kingdom the king, too, steps, as soon as he steps down from his throne (for thrones do have their privileges), and the cowering page at court dons his sacred freedom, too, as soon as he stands up straight as a

person. Then might the former be advised to replenish what he lacks from the surfeit of the other, and render the latter so much of dignity as he himself has need of grace.

Since dignity and grace have their diverse domains wherein they express themselves, they yet do not exclude one another in the same person, nor in fact, in the same condition; it is rather only from grace, that dignity receives its certification, and it is only from dignity, that grace receives its worth.

Dignity, indeed, everywhere proves, when we meet with it, a certain restraint of desires and inclinations. But, whether it might not rather be dullness of the sentient faculty (*severity*), which we take for self-restraint, and whether it be really moral self-activity and not the preponderance of another emotion, thus deliberate exertion, our doubts on this account can only be lifted by accompanying grace. Grace, that is, bespeaks a calm disposition, harmonious with itself, and a sensitive heart.

In the same way, grace of its own bespeaks a receptivity of the sentient faculty, and a concord of sentiments. But, that it be not indolence of the mind which leaves the senses so much freedom, and that it be morality which brought these sentiments into concord, this, in turn, only allied dignity can guarantee us. It is, that is, in dignity, that the subject proves his legitimacy as an independent force; and in that the will *restrains the license* of unwillful movements, it proclaims, that it merely *permits the freedom* of willful ones.

If grace and dignity are supported, the former by architectonic beauty, the latter by force, *united* in the same person, then the expression of humanity in the person is complete, and he stands there, justified in the world of mind, and exonerated in that of appearance. Both legislators here touch one another so closely, that their borders flow together. With softened lustre there rises in the smile of the mouth, in the tender animated look, in the cheerful brow, *freedom of reason*, and with sublime dispatch, *necessity of nature* is lost in the noble majesty of the countenance.

It was according to this ideal of human beauty that the art of antiquity was framed, and one recognizes it in the divine form of a Niobe, in Belvederean Apollo, in the Winged Genius of Borghesi, and in the Muse of the Barberini Palace.¹²

Where grace and dignity unite, we are alternately attracted and repulsed; attracted as intellects, repulsed as sensuous natures.

In dignity, that is, an example of the subjection of the senses to morality is held up to us, the imitation of which is for us at the same time law, but surmounting our physical capacities. The discord between the needs of nature and the requirement of the law, whose validity we yet acknowledge, strains sensuousness, and awakens the feeling called *respect*, which is inseparable from dignity.

In grace on the other hand, as in beauty generally, reason sees its demands fulfilled in sensuousness, and suddenly strides to meet it as the sensuous appearance of one of its own ideas. This unexpected concord of the fortuitousness of nature with the necessity of reason, awakens an emotion of joyous approbation, *good will*, which is relaxing for the senses, but animating and engaging for the mind, and an attraction of the sensuous object must follow. This attraction we call benevolence—*love*; an emotion which is inseparable from grace and beauty.

With *allurement* (allurement of love, or voluptuousness, stimulus), a sensuous thing is held up to the senses, which promises the satisfaction of a desire, that is, lust. Sense, therefore, strives to unite itself with sensuousness, and sensuous desire arises; an emotion, which is an excitement for the senses, but dulling for the mind.

One may say of respect, that it *bows down before* its object; of love, that it *inclines toward* its own. For respect, the object is reason and the subject is sensuous nature.¹³ In love, the object is sensuous, and the subject is moral nature. In sensuous desire, object and subject are sensuous.

Love alone, therefore, is a free emotion, for her pure source flows from the seat of freedom, from our divine

nature. Here it is not the petty and low which mingle with the great and high, not sense, which gazes dizzily aloft at the law of reason; it is the *absolutely grand* itself, which finds itself imitated in grace and dignity, and satisfied in sensuousness, it is the Legislator himself, the *God* in us, who plays with his own image in the world of sense. Sentiment is therefore relaxed in love, for it is strained in respect; here there is nothing which sets restraints, for absolute greatness has nothing above it, and sensuousness, from which alone restraints could come, accords in grace and beauty with the ideas of the mind. Love is a descent, for respect is a climbing upward. The bad person therefore can love nothing, although he must respect much; the good person therefore can respect little which he cannot embrace at the same time in love. The pure mind can only love, not respect; sense can only respect, but not love.

If the conscience-striken person is suspended in eternal fear of meeting the Legislator in himself in the world of sense, and catches sight of his enemy in everything great and beautiful and excellent, so the beautiful soul knows no sweeter happiness than to see that which is sacred in himself imitated or realized outside of himself, and to embrace in the world of sense his immortal friend. Love is that which is at once the most magnanimous and the most selfish in nature: the former, for she receives from her object nothing, rather gives him everything, for the pure mind can only give, and not receive; the latter, because it is always only her own self, which she seeks and esteems in her object.

But, just for the reason that the lover receives from the beloved only what he himself gave, so it often befalls him, that he gives what he does not receive. External sense believes it sees what only the internal sense may perceive, the fiery wish becomes belief, and the lover's own surfeit conceals the poverty of the beloved. That is why love is so often deceived, which seldom happens to respect and desire. As long as internal sense exalts the outer, just so long does the blissful enchantment of platonic love last, to which only the permanence is lacking for it to become the ecstasy

of the immortals. But, as soon as inner sense no longer insinuates *its own* view into that without, the external steps into its rights again, and demands its due, *matter*. The fire which enkindled heavenly Venus is employed by the earthly one, and natural impulse takes vengeance of long neglect, not seldom by an all the more unrestrained domination. Since sense is never deceived, it presses its advantage with coarse arrogance against its more noble rival, and makes bold to claim, that it has held what enthusiasm still owed.

Dignity prevents love from becoming desire. Grace takes care, that respect does not become fear.

True beauty, true grace should never arouse desire. Where the latter mingles, its object must either lack dignity, or the observer, morality of sentiment.

True greatness should never arouse fear. Where this occurs, one can be certain, that either its object lacks taste and grace, or the observer, a favorable testimony of his conscience.

Allurement, charm, and grace are in fact usually taken to be equivalent; but they are not, or should not be, for the concepts they express are of diverse species, which deserve a different characterization.

There is an animating and a calming grace. The first borders on excitement of the senses, and pleasure in the same can, if it is not restrained by dignity, easily degenerate into yearning. This can be called allurement. A languorous person cannot set himself in motion by inner force, rather, he must receive the material from the outside, and, by easy exercises of the fantasy, and rapid transitions from sentience to action, attempt to restore his vitality. This he accomplishes in the company of an *alluring* (enticing) person, who brings the stagnating sea of his powers of imagination into swing by discussion and glances.

Calming grace borders more closely on dignity, since it expresses itself by moderating agitated movements. To it the tensed person turns, and the wild storm of emotions dissipates itself upon its peacefully breathing chest. This can be called *grace*. With enticement, laughing wit and

thorns of mockery gladly go hand in hand; with grace, compassion and love. Unnerved Soliman pines away in the chains of Roxanne, while the tumultuous mind of an Othello lays itself to rest on the soft breast of a Desdemona.

Dignity, too, has its several shadings, and where it approaches grace and beauty, becomes *noble*, and where it borders on the timorous, *majesty*.

The highest degree of grace is *enchanting*; the highest degree of dignity, *majesty*. We lose ourselves at once in the enchanting, and flow over into the object. The highest enjoyment of freedom borders on its complete loss, and the intoxication of the mind, on the tumult of sensuous desire. Majesty, on the other hand, holds up to us a law, which obliges us to look into ourselves. We cast our eyes to the ground in the presence of God, forget everything outside ourselves, and feel nothing but the heavy burden of our own existence.

Only what is sacred has majesty. If a person can represent this to us, he has majesty; and although our knees do not follow, our mind will yet fall down before him. But, the mind will quickly rise again as soon as only the slightest trace of *human guilt* becomes visible in the object of our worship; for nothing, which is only *comparably* great, may cast down our courage.

Mere power, be it however terrible and limitless, can never lend majesty. Power impresses only the creature of sense, majesty must seize the freedom of the mind. A man who may write my death sentence, has no majesty as far as I am concerned on that account, as soon as I am but what I should be. His advantage over me is gone as soon as I will it. But, whoever presents me the pure will in his person, to him shall I bow down, even in the world to come.

Grace and dignity stand in too high value, not to entice vanity and folly to imitation. But, there is only *one* way to do that, that is by imitation of the disposition whereof they are the expression. Everything else is *mimicry*, and will make itself known soon enough through exaggeration.

Just as *pomposity* comes from mimicry of the sublime, the *precious* issues from imitation of the noble, affected grace becomes *airs*, and affected dignity, stiff *ceremony* and *gravity*.

Genuine grace *merely yields* and is willing to oblige; the false, on the other hand, *melts away*. True grace merely *indulges* the tools of willful movement, and wants not unnecessarily to encroach upon the freedom of nature; false grace has no heart at all to properly use the tools of the will, and, in order not to become severe or ponderous, rather sacrifices something of the purpose of the movement, or seeks to achieve it by *digression*. If the clumsy dancer in a minuet expends so much force, that it seems as though he were treading a mill-wheel, and cuts such sharp corners with his hands and feet, as if it all had to do with matters of geometrical precision, then the *affected* dancer will perform so weakly, that it seemed he feared the floor, and described nothing but serpentine lines with his hands and feet, though he were never to move from the spot. The fair sex, which is preeminently in possession of true grace, is also most often guilty of false grace; but nowhere does false grace greater insult, than where it serves as a fish-hook for desire. The smile of true grace then becomes the most repugnant grimace, the beautiful play of the eyes, so enchanting when it bespeaks true emotion, becomes a perversity, a melting modulating voice, so irresistible in a true mouth, becomes a studied tremulo noise, and the full voice of female charms a fraudulent artifice of the toilette.

While one has the opportunity to observe affected grace at the theater and in ballrooms, one can just as frequently study false dignity in the cabinets of ministers and the study rooms of scholars (especially from universities). While true dignity is satisfied to prevent emotion from becoming governor, and only sets restraint upon natural impulse where the latter wants to play the master in unwillful movements, false dignity governs even willful movements with an iron scepter, suppresses moral movements which are sacred to

true dignity, as well as sensuous ones, and extinguishes the entire mimical play of the soul in the lines of the face. False dignity is not merely stern against reluctant nature, but also severe against submissive nature, and seeks its ridiculous grandeur in the subjugation of, and, where that will not succeed, in the submersion of nature. It is not much different than if this false dignity had praised everything which is nature with irreconcilable hate, sticks the body in long folded robes, which conceal the limbs and form of the person entirely, constrains the use of the limbs with a burdensome apparatus of ornamentation, and shaves off the hair, to replace a gift of nature with an artificial contraption. While true dignity is never ashamed of nature, only coarse nature, also where it keeps to itself, yet remains free and open when emotion shines in the eyes, and a merry, calm spirit rests upon its speaking brow, *gravity* lays the brow of false dignity in folds, becomes closed and mysterious, and scrupulously supervises the features like a comedian. All facial muscles are tensed, all true natural expression vanishes, and the entire person is like a sealed letter. But, false dignity is not always wrong to keep sharp discipline over the mimical play of its features, because they might well reveal more than wants to be heard aloud—a precaution of which true dignity obviously has no need. The latter will only govern nature, not conceal her; with false dignity, nature rules all the more violently from within, because she is coerced from without.¹⁴

AUTHOR'S NOTES

1. Because—to repeat it once more—everything about beauty, which is *objective*, is given in *mere perception*. Since that which gives man precedence over all other creatures of sense does not *present itself* to mere perception, then a characteristic, which reveals itself to mere perception, cannot make this preeminence visible. His higher destiny, which alone is the cause of this preeminence, is thus not expressed by his beauty, and a sensuous concep-

tion of his beauty can, therefore, never furnish an ingredient of the former destiny, cannot be admitted in aesthetic judgment. It is not the thought itself, of which the human frame is the expression, but merely the effects thereof in its appearance, which reveal themselves to sense. Mere sense elevates itself to the supersensuous cause of these effects as little, as (if one will permit me this example) the merely sensuous man rises aloft to the idea of the supreme cause of the world, when satisfying his carnal impulses.

2. Therefore, Home takes the concept of grace too narrowly, when he says (*Grundsätze d. Kritik II*, 39): "that, if the most charming person is at *rest*, and neither moves nor speaks, we lose sight of the quality of charm, like colors in the dark." No, we do not lose sight of it, as long as we perceive those lines upon the sleeping person, which a benevolent and mild mind formed; and precisely the most treasured part of grace remains, that very part, which congealed *demeanor into lines*, and thus reveals the *preparedness* of mind in beautiful emotions. If, however, Mr. *Rectifier of the Works of Home* believes he sets his author aright with the remark, (pg. 459 of the same work) "that charm is not limited to willful movements, that a sleeping person does not cease to be charming"—and why?, "because, while he is in this condition, the involuntary, soft, and, for that very reason, the more graceful movements first become evident," he thus abolishes, annuls the concept of grace altogether, which Home merely conceived too narrowly. Involuntary movements in sleep, if they are not mechanical repetitions of willful ones, can never be graceful, far from their being preeminently such, and if a sleeping person is charming, this is by no means on account of the movements which he makes, but because of the *lines*, which attest to previous movements.

3. Philosophical writings, I. 90.

4. When something happens in front of a numerous company, it can befall, that each of those present has his own opinion about the disposition of the acting person, so fortuitously are willful movements connected with their moral cause. If, on the other hand, one out of this company unexpectedly catches sight of a very beloved friend or a very hated enemy, the unequivocal expression on his face would certainly and quickly betray the sentiments of his heart, and the judgment of the entire company on the present sentient condition of this person would probably

be completely unanimous: for here the expression is connected with its cause in the sentiment by natural necessity.

5. Upon a practiced sensibility, both can have the same effect as the original which they imitate, and if the art is great, they can even deceive the expert for a time. But, from some motion or other will the compulsion and intention ultimately shine forth, and then indifference, if not even contempt and disgust, are the inevitable result. As soon as we notice, that the architectonic beauty is affected, we see just that much of humanity (as appearance) disappear, as has been added from a foreign source—and how shall we, who do not forgive the surrender of yet a single fortuitous excellence, take pleasure in, yea even look upon an exchange indifferently, whereby a part of humanity is surrendered for base nature? How shall we, although we might pardon the effect, not despise the deceit?—as soon as we notice, that the grace is artified, our heart closes suddenly, and the soul rising up to meet it flees in retreat. We see matter having suddenly been created out of mind, and an image of clouds out of a divine Juno.

Far be it from me, in this compilation, to deny the dance-master his merits on behalf of true grace, or the actor his claim thereto. The dance-master incontestably comes to the aid of true grace, in that he empowers the will with mastery of its tools, and sweeps aside the hindrances, which *mass* and *gravity* pose against the play of vital forces. He cannot accomplish this other than according to *rules*, which maintain the body in healthy discipline, and for as long as inertia resists, stiffly, these must be *compelling* and so may also appear to be such. But, when he discharges the apprentice from his school, the rules must already have performed their service upon him, so that they *need not accompany* him into the world: in brief, the work of rules must pass over into nature.

The low estimation, with which I speak of theatric graces, holds only for those that are *imitated*, and these I do not hesitate to castigate, on the stage just as in life. I confess, that the actor does not please me, who, however successfully he accomplishes his imitation, has studied his *Graces* at the toilette. The demands we make upon the actor, are: 1. *truth* of performance, and 2. beauty of performance. Now, I claim, that the actor, as far as *truth of performance* is concerned, must bring forth everything through art and nothing through nature, for otherwise he is no artist; and I shall admire him, if I hear or see, that he, who masterfully

played an enraged Guelfo, is a person of tender character; on the other hand, I claim, that, as far as *grace of performance* is concerned, he must needs owe his art nothing, and that here everything about him must be a freely-willed work of nature. If it occurs to me, in respect of the truth of his playing, that this character is not natural to him, then I shall esteem him all the more; if I notice, in respect of the beauty of his playing, that these graceful movements are not natural to him, I shall not be able to restrain myself from being angry at him who had to avail himself of the resources of the *artist*. This is because grace vanishes where there is no naturalness, and because grace is still a demand which we believe ourselves justified in making of mere human beings. What shall I now answer to the mimic artist, who would like to know, since he cannot *learn* it, how he may come into possession of grace? He should—this is my view—first of all ensure, that the humanity in him comes to maturity, and then he should go hence and (if it is his profession) represent it upon the stage.

6. Hence we often find, that such beauty of form is considerably enlarged already in middle age by obesity, that, instead of those barely suggested tender lines of skin, *cavities* sink in and sausage-like folds protrude, that *weight*, unnoticeably, exerts its influence on the form, and that the alluring manifold play of beautiful lines upon the surface loses itself in a uniform swelling cushion of fat. Nature takes, what she once had given.

I mention in passing, that something similar happens to *genius*, which in its origin in general, as in its effects, has much in common with architectonic beauty. Like the latter, the former is a mere *product of nature*, and according to the perverse way of thinking of people, who esteem that most, which cannot be imitated according to any rule, and cannot be obtained through any merit, beauty is more admired than charm, genius more than the acquired power of mind. Both *favorites of nature*, for all of their bad manners (on account of which they are not seldom the object of deserved contempt), are considered as a kind of nobility by birth, as a higher caste, because their advantages depend upon nature, and therefore lie beyond all choice.

But, just as it befalls beauty, when she does not take timely care, to draw forth *grace* for support, so it also befalls *genius*, if it neglects to strengthen itself by principles, taste, and science. Fitted out with lively and flourishing powers of imagination (and nature can grant nothing but sensuous advantages), so betimes

may it consider, to secure itself this ambiguous gift by the sole use, whereby natural talents can become possessions of mind; I mean, by giving form to matter; for the mind can call nothing but form its own. Governed by no proportionate force of reason, the uncultivated, sumptuous *power of nature* will outgrow the freedom of understanding, and suffocate it, just as in the case of architectonic beauty, mass ultimately suppresses form.

Of this, experience, I think, provides ample proof, especially in respect of those poetic geniuses, who become famous, sooner than they are mature, and where, as is often the case with beauty, the entirety of talent is often only *youth*. But, when the short spring is past, and one asks after the fruits of which it offered hope, then these are spongy and often crippled offspring, which a misguided, blind forming impulse produced. Precisely there, where one can expect, that matter ennobles itself into form and the forming mind lays its ideas into the appearance, they are, like any other product of nature, fallen back into the matter, and the meteors so promising appear very common lights—if not quite less. For the poeticizing power of imagination [*Einbildungskraft*] often sinks utterly back into the matter, from which it had disentangled itself, and does not disdain, to serve nature with another *more solid* edifice, if poetical production will no longer quite succeed.

7. See the confession on the subject of human nature by the author of the *Critique* in his latest book, *Revelation Within the Limits of Reason*, Part 1.

8. On this matter, see the theory of will, most worthy of attention, in the second part of Rheinholt's *Letters*.

9. One must not, however, confuse this interrogation of will at the gate of reason with that, where it should learn of the *means* through which it is to satisfy a desire. The issue here is not, how satisfaction is to be *accomplished*, rather, whether it is *permitted*. Only this belongs in the moral realm, the former is an issue of cleverness.

10. If one finds only movements of the second kind, without those of the first, this indicates, that the person wants the emotion, but nature gainsays it. If one finds movements of the first kind, without those of the second, this proves, that nature manifests itself in the emotion, but the person prohibits it. The first case one sees every day in affected persons and bad comedians; the second more rarely and only in strong dispositions.

11. This is dealt with more comprehensively in the third edition of *Thalia*, in an investigation of representations of pathos.

12. With that fine and grand insight which is his, Winkelmann (*History of Art*, Part I. pp. 280 ff.) described this high beauty, which issues from the combination of grace and dignity. But, that which he found united, he took and presented to be, in fact, one, and remained fixed upon what his senses alone had taught him, without investigating whether it should be separated. He confuses the concept of grace, because he comprehends the characteristics which obviously belong to dignity alone in this conception. But, grace and dignity are fundamentally different, and it is unjust to make that which is a *limitation* of grace into its characteristic. What Winkelmann calls the high, heavenly grace is nothing but beauty combined with grace, with predominant dignity. "Heavenly grace," he says, "appears self-sufficient, and does not offer itself, but wants to be sought after. She encloses in herself the movements of the soul, and feeds upon the sacred stillness of divine nature.—Through her," he says in another place, "did the artist of Niobe dare the kingdom of incorporeal ideas, and reached the secret of combining the fear of death with the highest beauty." (It would be difficult to make any sense of this, were it not obvious, that only dignity is meant here.) "He became a creator of pure spirits, which awaken no desire of the senses, for they seem not to be made for passion, but only to have assumed the shape of passion."—In yet another place, he says, "the soul expressed itself only beneath the calm surface of the water, and never erupted in passion. The greatest pain remains enfolded in the idea of suffering, and joy wafts like a gentle breeze, which hardly stirs the leaves, upon the face of a Leukothea." All of these characteristics belong to dignity, and not to grace, for grace does not enfold herself, but steps forth, and grace is not sublime, but beautiful. But, dignity is that, which holds nature back in her expressions, and commands calm to the features, even in the fear of death and in the bitterest suffering of a Laocoön. Home succumbs to the same mistake, which is less astonishing for this writer. He, too, takes characteristics of dignity to be those of grace, although he strictly distinguishes grace and dignity. His observations are usually correct, and the rules he constructs from them, true: but one cannot follow him further (*Grundsätze d. Kritik II*, Anmut und Würde).

13. One must not confuse *respect* with *esteem*. Respect (according to its pure concept) only applies to the relationship of sensuous nature to the demands of pure practical reason in general, without regard to an actual fulfillment. "The feeling of inappropriateness to the accomplishment of an idea, which is a law for us, is called respect" (Kant's *Critique of Judgment*). Respect is therefore not a pleasant, but an oppressive sentiment. It is the feeling of the distance of the empirical will from the pure one.—It therefore ought not to be surprising, that I make sensuous nature the subject of respect, although this only applies to *pure reason*; for the inappropriateness to the realization of the law can only lie in sensuousness. Esteem, on the other hand, applies to the real fulfillment of the law, and is felt, not on account of the law, rather on account of the person, who acts in accordance with the law. Esteem is, therefore, something delightful, because the fulfillment of the law must delight creatures of reason. Respect is compulsion, esteem is already a free sentiment. But, the source of that is love, which constitutes an ingredient of esteem. Even the good-for-nothing must respect the good, but to esteem him, who has done the Good, he would have to cease to be a good-for-nothing.

14. Nonetheless, there is *ceremony* in a good sense, whereof art can make use. This arises not from the arrogance, to make oneself important, rather, it aims at *preparing* emotion for something important. Where a great and deep impression is to be made, and the poet's chief concern is, that nothing of it be lost, he tunes emotion to be receptive of the impression beforehand, removes all distractions, and sets the powers of the imagination in an expectant tension.

Now, to this effect, *ceremony* is quite appropriate, where there is an accumulation of preparations, which do not betray their purpose, and an intentional delay of the progress of events, where impatience demands dispatch. In music, the ceremonious is brought forth by a *slow*, uniform sequence of strong tones; the intensity awakens and tenses emotion, the slow beat delays satisfaction, and the uniformity of the beat lets impatience see no end.

Ceremony supports the impression of greatness and sublimity not a little, and is used with success in religious rituals and mysteries. The effects of bells, choral music, and the organ are known; but there is also something *ceremonious* for the eye, that is, *pomp*,

combined with the awesome, as in funereal ceremonies, and on all public occasions, which observe a grand style and a slow beat.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

* The second edition of Immanuel Kant's *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft*, was published in 1794, one year after the completion of *Über Anmut und Würde*, published in *Thalia*, 1793. (The translation is not mine, but by Theodore M. Greene, who studied under Norman Kemp Smith in the early 1920s in Edinburgh.)

Kant inserted the following footnote in the first part of *Religion . . .*, "On Radical Evil In Human Nature: 'Professor Schiller, in his masterly treatise (*Thalia*, 1793, Part III) on grace and dignity in morality, objects to this way of representing obligation, as carrying with it a monastic cast of mind. Since, however, we are at one upon the most important principles, I cannot admit that there is disagreement here, if only we can make ourselves clear to one another. I freely grant that, by very reason of the dignity of the *idea of duty*, I am unable to associate *grace* with it. For the idea of duty involves absolute necessity, to which grace stands in direct contradiction. The majesty of the moral law (as of the law on Sinai) instills awe (not dread, which repels, nor yet charm, which invites familiarity); and in this instance, since the ruler resides within us, this *respect*, as of a subject toward his ruler, awakens a *sense of the sublimity* of our own destiny, which enraptures us more than any beauty. *Virtue*, also, i.e., the firmly grounded disposition strictly to fulfill our duty, is also *beneficent* in its results, beyond all that nature and art can accomplish in the world; and the august picture of humanity, as portrayed in this character does indeed allow the attendance of the *Graces*. But, when duty alone is the theme, they keep a respectful distance. If we consider, further, the happy results which virtue, should she gain admittance everywhere, would spread throughout the world, we see morally directed reason (by means of the imagination) calling the sentiments into play. Only after vanquishing monsters did Hercules become Musagetes, leader of the Muses—labors from which those worthy sisters, trembling, draw back. The attendants of Venus Urania become wantons in the train of Venus

Dione, as soon as they meddle in the business of determining duty and try to provide springs of action thereof.

"Now if one asks, what is the *aesthetic character*, the *temperament*, so to speak, of *virtue*, whether courageous and hence *joyous*, or fear-ridden and dejected, an answer is hardly necessary. This latter, slavish frame of mind can never occur without a hidden *hatred* of the law. And a heart which is happy in the *performance* of its duty (not merely complacent in the *recognition* thereof) is a mark of genuineness in the virtuous disposition—of genuineness even in *piety*, which does not consist in the self-inflicted torment of a repentant sinner (a very ambiguous state of mind, which ordinarily is nothing but an inward regret at having infringed upon the rules of prudence), but rather in the firm resolve to do better in the future. This resolve, then, encouraged by good progress, must needs beget a joyous frame of mind, without which man is never certain of having really *attained a love* for the good, i.e., of having incorporated it into his maxim."

†*Religion . . .* Part I, Section III, "Man is Evil by Nature," begins with the quote "*Vitiis nemo sine nascitur*," Horace ("No one is born free of vices"), and continues: ". . . He is evil *by nature*, means but this, that evil can be predicated of man as a species; not that such a quality can be inferred from the concept of his species (that is, of man in general)—for then it would be necessary; but rather, that from what we know of man through experience we cannot judge otherwise of him, or, that we may presuppose evil to be subjectively necessary to every man, even to the best. . . . Hence, we can call this a natural propensity to evil, and as we must, after all, ever hold man responsible for it, we can further call it a *radical*, innate *evil* in human nature (yet nonetheless brought upon us by ourselves). . . ." And further on, ". . . Now if a propensity to this (inversion of the ethical order) does lie in human nature, there is in man a natural propensity to evil; and since this very propensity must in the end be sought in a will which is free, and can therefore be imputed, it is morally evil. This evil is *radical*, because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as a natural propensity, *inextirpable* by human powers, since extirpation could occur only through good maxims, and cannot take place when the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as corrupt; yet, at the same time, it must be possible to *overcome* it, since it is found in man, a being whose actions are free. We are not then to call the

depravity of human nature *wickedness*, taking the word in its strict sense as a disposition (the subjective *principle* of the maxims) to adopt evil, *as evil*, into our maxim, as our incentives (for that is diabolical); we should rather term it the *perversity* of the heart, which, then, because of what follows from it, is also called an *evil heart*. Such a heart may coexist with a will which in general is good: it arises from the frailty of human nature, the lack of sufficient strength to follow out the principles it has chosen for itself, joined with its impurity, the failure to distinguish the incentives. . . .”